Aggregate Demand Policy in Mature and Dual Economies by Skott, Peter
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics 
2019 
Aggregate Demand Policy in Mature and Dual Economies 
Peter Skott 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper 
 Part of the Economics Commons 





Aggregate demand is important, both in the short and the long run,
but a basic distinction must be made between dual and mature economies.
Mature economies may su¤er from a structural aggregate problem (secu-
lar stagnation): full-employment growth may be impossible in the absence
of sustained scal stimulus. Dual economies with high levels of open or
hidden unemployment, by contrast, do not face long-run structural ag-
gregate demand problems. They require public investment in key areas,
including education and infrastructure, but the key problems concern the
composition of demand and the need to expand the modern sector. These
economies face structural transformation problems.
1 Introduction
The possibility of secular stagnationin the US and other advanced economies
gained renewed attention during the great recession. Emerging economies have
also experienced problems recently. Many Latin American countries have seen a
reversal of fortunes, and China may face the prospect of slower economic growth.
The analysis of these long-run growth issues must, I shall argue, consider the
supply side as well as aggregate demand. Supply and demand factors interact,
and policy recommendations that make sense for advanced economies may cause
great harm if applied to emerging economies.
Aggregate demand policy is important, both in the short and the long
run. There is a basic distinction, however, between labor-constrained mature
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economies and capital-constrained dual economies. Mature economies may suf-
fer from a structural aggregate problem (secular stagnation): full-employment
growth may be impossible in the absence of sustained scal stimulus. Dual
economies with high levels of open or hidden unemployment, by contrast, do
not face long-run structural aggregate demand problems. They require public
investment in key areas, including education and infrastructure, but the key
problems concern the composition of demand and the need to expand the mod-
ern sector. These economies face structural transformation problems.
Section 2 outlines a simple one-sector framework for analyzing steady growth.
Section 3 discusses the application of the framework to mature economies. The
challenges and policy priorities in dual economies are analyzed in section 4.
Section 5 o¤ers a few concluding remarks.
2 Goods market equilibrium and the warranted
growth rate
In line with most post-Keynesian growth models, I assume a Leontief production
function
Y = minfK; Lg
The xed coe¢ cients may be the ex-post reection of a choice of technique.
The choice of technique could be determined by the rate of interest (the cost of
nance) which in turn could be set by policy makers. The maximization of con-
sumption per e¢ ciency unit of labor in a Solow model with perfect competition,
for instance, requires that the capital intensity be consistent with the golden
rule: the rate of return on capital must be equal to the rate of growth.
The golden rule and the assumptions behind the Solow model may not be
appealing, but the existence of a policy target for the interest rate does not
depend on a neoclassical production function with smooth substitution. The
set of available techniques can be specied more generally, and the existence of
a choice of technique is consistent with the insights from the Cambridge capital
controversy, including reswitching and capital reversing. Indeed, the choice-of-
technique argument is in line with Sra¤as (1960, p. 33) suggestion that the
rate of prots "can well be determined from outside the system of production,
in particular by the level of the money rate of interest". More importantly
for the purposes of this paper, a policy-determined real rate of interest (and an
associated choice of technique) is consistent with Lerners principle of functional
nance (cf. footnote 7 below).
My concern in this paper is with long-run growth and, disregarding short-run
lags, I take consumption to be a linearly homogeneous function of disposable
income and wealth.1 With this assumption, the goods market equilibrium con-
dition for a closed economy can be written
Y = C(Y   T;W ) + I +G (1)
1The specication has empirical support; e.g. Hendry and Muellbauer (2018).
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Y;C; I andG denote output, consumption, investment and government spending
on goods and services. T is taxes net of transfers, where transfers include interest
payments on the public debt; W is private sector wealth.












= f(t; w) + (g + )
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+ ; ft < 0; fw > 0 (2)
where g; ; ; t and w denote the growth rate, the rate of depreciation, the share
of government spending in output (G=Y ), the share of taxes net of transfers
(T=Y ), and the ratio of private wealth to income (W=Y ). For simplicity, I take




By assumption the choice of technique  the technically determined max-
imum output-capital ratio   is given. The actual output capital ratio is
determined by the choice of technique and the utilization rate of capital, u. I
shall assume that in steady growth the utilization rate will be at the desired
level, u = ud. This desired level will be determined by structural character-
istics and may change as the result of changes in, for instance, the degree of
product market competition or the volatility of rm-level demand. For present
purposes, however, there is no harm in taking the desired rate of utilization as
constant.3 With these assumptions, the capital-output ratio in steady growth
is given, K=Y = (ud) 1 = , and equation (2) describes a tradeo¤ between
the rate of accumulation g and the share of private plus public consumption in
income (f(t; w) + )).
The tradeo¤ corresponds to the well-known consumption-growth frontier in
classical economics. But the interpretation of the tradeo¤ is Harrodian: equa-
tion (2) denes a warranted rate of growth, g. This warranted growth rate
need not be equal to the natural growth rate (the growth rate of the labor sup-
ply in e¢ ciency units, taking into account labor saving technical change). The
warranted growth path, second, is likely to be unstable: the economy does not
automatically converge to the warranted path.
The implications of the general framework in this section depends on the
supply side, and I consider two stylized cases: mature economies and dual
economies.
2 In a corporate economy household wealth takes the form of nancial assets, including
equity and corporate bonds, rather than direct ownership of xed capital. The analysis is
extended in this direction by Ryoo and Skott (2013).
3This Harrodian assumption di¤ers from Kaleckian specications. Amit Bhaduris work
with Steve Marglin has been foundational for the Kaleckian literature on growth and dis-
tribution (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990, Marglin and Bhaduri 1990). I have found Bhaduris
contributions on this and other issues to be consistently inspiring and thought provoking, even
if at times I have taken di¤erent positions.
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3 Mature economies
The capital stock is large relative to the labor supply in a mature economy, and
long-run economic growth is constrained by the growth rate of the labor supply
in e¢ ciency units.
To avoid misunderstanding it should be stressed, rst, that a mature econ-
omy need not have full employment. An economy is mature if fast growth
rates of aggregate demand would create labor constraints within a relatively
short period. The USA, Japan and most west European countries are mature
in this sense: Chinese style growth rates of 10 percent a year would lead to over-
heating and labor shortages within a few years. Thus, an economy with 5, 10 or
15 percent unemployment can be mature, even taking into account discouraged
workers and the limitations of the o¢ cial unemployment rate as a measure of
labor market conditions in these economies. In some economies, however, the
o¢ cial unemployment rate is meaningless as an indicator of labor constraints on
economic growth. An example is India whose o¢ cial unemployment rate stands
at less than 4 percent. This o¢ cial rate is pretty meaningless; the expansion of
the modern sector in India is not held back by labor constraints.
The notion of maturity, second, does not require an exogenous growth rate
of the labor supply in e¢ ciency units. The natural growth rate may respond
to labor shortages, both because of induced technical change as rms search for
labor saving innovations and because in open economies high employment rates
may soften the attitudes of policy makers and the electorate towards immigra-
tion. This endogeneity is compatible with maturity. Long-run labor constraints
are relevant even with an endogenous natural growth rate as long as the nat-
ural rate has an upper limit and does not adjust fully to any possible increase
in the growth rate of aggregate demand.4
Extensions of the model that include endogeneity of the natural rate do not
change the qualitative argument, and to simplify the exposition I shall take
the natural growth rate n  the growth rate that is required to maintain a
constant, target rate of employment as given. For convenience the target rate
of employment will be referred to simply as full employment.
Now consider the equilibrium condition for the goods market in a mature
economy. With a constant capital output ratio, K=Y = , the accumulation
rate g must be equal to the growth rate of output. Thus, full-employment
growth requires that g = n, and the share of public and private consumption
must take a particular value:
C +G
Y
= f(t; w) +  = 1  (n+ ) (3)
4Maturity in this sense excludes specications like the one in Dutt (2006). Dutt assumes
that the growth rate of the growth rate of labor productivity depends on the employment rate.
This assumption implies that productivity growth becomes perfectly elastic in the long run.
There is no upper bound on productivity growth and no long-run supply constraints from the
labor market. The US or the European economies can achieve long-run growth rates of 5, 10
or 20 percent annually without encountering labor constraints.
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The size of the public sector the share of government consumption in in-
come () is contentious: people di¤er widely in their views on the role of gov-
ernment and the appropriate share of government spending in GDP. Arguably,
however, the exigencies of demand management should not be decisive in the
determination of the levels of spending on government programs. I therefore
take  as exogenous.5
Taking  as given, equation (3) the condition for full-employment growth
 must be satised through adjustments in private consumption. The ratio
of private sector wealth to potential output (w) is predetermined in the short
run and, having pinned down n; ;  and ; there is only one free variable, the
share of taxes in income. Thus, equation (3) determines a full-employment
trajectory for the tax rate t: Government debt and household wealth (! =
 + b) change endogenously over time, and the tax rate associated with full-
employment growth therefore will be time-varying too.
Intuitively, consumption private or public must ll the gap between full-
employment output and investment. This gap can be large when low natural
rates of growth limit the need for additional capital capacity: if the private
saving rate is high and the government runs a balanced budget, the warranted
growth rate may exceed the natural growth rate. When this happens, the econ-
omy faces structural aggregate demand problems or, using Hansens (1939)
terminology, secular stagnation.6
Secular stagnation calls for scal policy along the lines suggested by Lerners
principle of functional nance.7 Private saving rates that are excessive in rela-
tion to the natural growth rate can be countered by a reduction in taxes and
an increase in the government decit (which raises consumption and reduces
5This argument does not rule out changes in the timing of government spending to coun-
teract recessions or serious overheating of the economy. Uncertainty, lack of information, and
lags of all kinds complicate stabilization policy. The lags and inexibilities may be particularly
severe for scal policy, at least in the US; many European economies with parliamentary sys-
tems have greater exibility. Ryoo and Skott (2017) analyze the stabilization of a Harrodian
economy using scal and monetary policy; see also Franke (2018).
6Recently, Summers (2013, 2015) has generated widespread interest in the possibility of
secular stagnation; Krugman (1998) raised similar issues for Japan.
Outside the mainstream, structural aggregate demand problems have been discussed by,
among others, Godley (1999), Wray (2000), Skott (2001), Palley (2002) and Nakatani and
Skott (2007).
7The principle of functional nance
"prescribes, rst, the adjustment of total spending (by everybody in the econ-
omy, including the government) in order to eliminate both unemployment and
ination ... ; second, the adjustment of public holdings of money and of govern-
ment bonds, by government borrowing or debt repayment, in order to achieve
the rate of interest which results in the most desirable level of investment; and,
third, the printing, hoarding or destruction of money as needed for carrying out
the rst two parts of the program." (Lerner 1943, p. 41)
The setting of interest rates to achieve a "desirable level of investment" in the short run
translates into choosing a desirable capital-output ratio in the long run. By assumption,
scal policy is designed to keep output at the level associated with full employment, and
I=Y = (I=K))K=Y )  (n+)(K=Y ): Thus, choosing the investment-output ratio corresponds
to choosing the capital-output ratio in the long run.
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the aggregate saving rate). Analogously, private saving rates that are too low
relative to the natural growth rate call for contractionary policies (which raise
the aggregate saving rate).
The use of scal policy to counteract long-run aggregate demand problems
raise questions of debt sustainability. Countless exercises have addressed the
sustainability question by looking at the implications of exogenously specied
paths of primary decits and aggregate output (e.g. Chalk 2000). Exercises of
this kind represent a peculiar approach to policy. If it is taken for granted a
priori that output will follow some exogenous trajectory of potential output,
then by assumption there is no need for scal policy. And if one abandons the
exogenous output trajectory, why would anyone want to maintain a constant
ratio of primary decits to GDP? Arbitrary policies rarely bring great results.
If scal policy is used sensibly in accordance with functional nance, primary
decits will not be independent of movements in private-sector demand. On the
contrary, scal policy must be adjusted continuously to keep aggregate demand
growing at a rate that is consistent with full employment and price stability.
The sustainability analysis should consider sensible policies of this kind.
Continuous adjustments of the tax rate t to satisfy equation (3) generate
dynamic trajectories for government debt and private wealth. Taxes T are
net of transfers, and transfers are dened in equation (1) to include interest
payments on the public debt. Thus, at each moment the change in government
debt is given by
_B = G  T = (   t)Y
or
_b =    t  nb (4)
where b = B=Y is the debt-GDP ratio and the tax rate t is determined by
equation (3). The tax rate depends on the wealth ratio w; and we have w =
 + b: Substituting the solution for the tax rate into equation (4), we get a one-
dimensional di¤erential equation to determine the dynamics of the debt ratio
b.
The precise implications for public debt depend on the specication of con-
sumption behavior. The qualitative properties are quite robust, however:8
 A scal policy based on functional nance produces strong stabilizing
e¤ects on the debt-income ratio. As debt increases, householdswealth
and interest income both increase. Consequently, private consumption
demand will tend to rise, scal policy needs to be tightened, and the debt
ratio ceases to grow. These stabilizing feedback e¤ects produce a stable
stationary solution for the debt ratio, b! b <1:
This result addresses the long-run sustainability question: low growth
rates of potential output necessitate expansionary policy if secular stag-
nation is to be avoided. But the debt ratio need not explode.
8Ryoo and Skott (2013) consider a stock-ow consistent Keynesian model; Skott and Ryoo
(2014) analyze a standard OLG models, and Skott and Ryoo (2017) a modied Keynesian
OLG model; Skott (2016a, 2016b) discuss the main ndings in greater detail. An earlier
paper by Schlicht (2006) derived some of the results using a traditional Keynesian model.
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 High natural rates of growth are associated with low long-run values of
the debt ratio b, and the causal link unambiguously runs from growth to
debt.
This result has obvious implications for the interpretation of negative cor-
relations between debt ratios and the rate of growth. The inuential study
by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) contained elementary spreadsheet errors,
but a negative correlation can still be found in the data (albeit in a much
milder form) after correction of these errors. Correlation, however, is not
causation, and the model shows that we should expect a causal e¤ect from
low growth to high debt. In the model, the high debt unambiguously rep-
resents an e¤ect, not a cause of low growth.9 A less expansionary policy
would not raise the rate of economic growth but lead to secular stagnation.
 The long-run debt ratio b depends on the structure of taxation. Taxing
low income households with a high marginal consumption rate produces
a high debt ratio; taxing high income households with a low marginal
consumption rate produces a low debt ratio.
This result has implications, inter alia, for the recent Trump tax reform in
the US. Other aspects of the reform including its direct implications for
inequality may be much more signicant, but the reform implies that the
long-run debt ratio will increase as the relative tax burden shifts from the
rich towards low and middle income households. The short-run increase
in decits and public debt following the tax cuts will not be reversed in
the long run, if full employment is to be maintained.
 Paradoxically, high levels of government consumption produce low debt
ratios in the long run.
This result has implications for austerity policies which aim to reduce
public debt by cutting government consumption. These policies can have
and have had devastating short and medium run economic and social
consequences, and the political fallout has included the rise of right-wing
nationalism. The analysis shows that in the long run, the policies will also
fail on their own terms in economies with a structural demand problem: a
return to full employment will require an increase in the debt ratio if the
share of government consumption in income has been reduced.
Clearly scal policy does not always follow a pure functional nance prescrip-
tion European austerity policy after the nancial crisis is an obvious example.
But real-world policies often amount to a kind of impure functional nance.
It is no coincidence that Japanese public debt rose rapidly from the early 1990s
or that the US implemented a scal stimulus package in 2009. The analysis of
pure functional nancetherefore has real-world relevance. It is of descriptive
interest because of automatic scal stabilizers and because policy makers facing
9A number of studies, including Ash et al. (2017), nd evidence that slow growth tends
to precede the rise in debt. It is di¢ cult, however, to establish causal links between debt and
growth from purely empirical methods. Theory is needed to help sort out long-run causation.
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high unemployment will be pulled towards expansionary discretionary policies.
It is of prescriptive interest because it shows that fears of debt unsustainabil-
ityare unfounded but that the debt implications depend on the structure of
taxation.
There are complications and caveats. Economies, rst, that do not issue debt
in their own currency cannot control the interest rate on public debt and may
be forced to default, a possibility that severely limits their policy space. Even if
debt is being issued in a sovereign currency, second, the conduct of scal policy
in open economies must consider the balance of payments and the real exchange
rate as well as unemployment and ination. High debt levels, nally, can have
negative side e¤ects with respect to the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy and the
intra-generational distribution of income.
But functional nance starts from the right premise: scal and monetary
policies should be judged on their implications for outcomes that we care about.
Moreover, scal policy can be crucial in addressing structural aggregate demand
problems: in the absence of a sustained scal stimulus, a mature economy may
experience a structural aggregate demand problem or secular stagnation. The
achievement of full employment growth may require low taxes (high disposable
income) and/or high public debt (high ratios of household wealth to income) in
order for consumption to ll the gap between full-employment output and the
sum of investment and government consumption.
4 Dual economies
Dating back to Lewis (1954), stylized versions of dual economies have distin-
guished between two sectors, a modern/formal sector and a traditional/informal
sector. As a rst approximation, the supply of labor to the modern sector is
perfectly elastic. The capital stock in the modern sector rather than the labor
supply represents the binding supply-side constraint in the modern sector, and
this di¤erence fundamentally alters the policy problem.
It is the low natural rate of growth that generates a structural aggregate
demand problem in mature economies. This problem does not arise in dual
economies. There are no labor constraints and fast accumulation is desirable 
the faster the accumulation rate the better. In a dual economy it should be a
top priority to expand the modern sector and create high-productivity jobs for
the underemployed workers in the informal sector.
The absence of labor constraints does not imply that there are no supply-
side constraints on the expansion of the modern sector. Utilization rates in the
modern sector vary signicantly in the short run, and stabilization policy can be
essential in economies with any kind of Harrodian instability. Upward instability
will be curbed eventually by capacity ceilings, but can cause serious damage
in the form of ination and/or balance of payments crises if the instability
remains unchecked until these limits kick in; downward instability meets no
similar capacity oors, and stabilization policy may be necessary to prevent
crises and long term stagnation. But stabilization is distinct from permanent
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scal stimulus.
Assuming successful stabilization, the capital-output ratio uctuates around
levels associated with the desired rate of utilization, and the economy faces a
consumption-investment tradeo¤. The expansion of the modern sector requires
high accumulation rates, and high accumulation rates are associated with high
shares of investment in income.10
A one-sector model can be used to formalize this argument if it is assumed
that the modern sector can draw on an innitely elastic labor supply from the
traditional sector but that otherwise each of the two sectors is entirely self-
contained. With this assumption the equilibrium condition (2) still holds for
the modern sector. The di¤erence compared to the mature economy lies in the
absence of labor constraints; there is no natural rate of growth for the modern
sector in a dual economy.
Re-writing equation (2), we have




]=    = [1  f(t; w)  ]=    (5)
From equation (5) it follows that consumption must be squeezed to allow high
accumulation. This squeeze on consumption can be achieved by increasing taxes.
Successful development therefore will typically be associated with low govern-
ment decits and low public debt: the higher is the growth rate g, the lower
must be the share of private consumption f(t; w), and the higher, therefore, the
required share of taxes in income and/or the lower the debt ratio b and the ratio
of private sector wealth to income w:
Several comments may be in order. It is important to emphasize, rst, that
squeezing consumption need not imply a reduction in the living standards of the
poor. Not all prots are invested, and many dual economies have rich elites. In
principle, the resources for investment could come from policies that curb luxury
consumption; in practice the political and economic power of the elites present
obstacles to policies along these lines. It should be noted also that large parts of
consumptionare mislabelled and should be considered investment. An obvious
example is the misleading classication of public spending on education as public
consumption. Spending on healthcare, food and housing for low-income families
also contain signicant elements of investment: a healthier and better educated
workforce can raise labor productivity and protability in the modern sector,
and improve the prospects for future growth. Thus, prioritizing investment does
not imply squeezing everything that is classied as consumption in the national
accounts.
Second, it is clearly not enough to create space for private sector investment
by cutting down consumption. Many essential investment projects will not be
carried out by the private sector. Public investment in infrastructure, education
and health is crucial for successful development; it complements and crowds in
private investment. In this context it should be noted that not all modern-
sector activities are equally conducive to long-term economic growth and that
10The investment share has approached 50 percent in China, and the positive correlation
between growth and the investment share is well established (e.g. Girardi and Pariboni 2018).
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industrial policy can play a decisive role in promoting structural transformation
(e.g. Chang 2008).
Third, because of the importance of public investment it may be useful to
distinguish explicitly between government consumption and government invest-
ment. Let  denote the share of government consumption in income and let  be
the fraction of total investment that is undertaken by government, IG = I: If
the growth rate g and the capital-output ratio  are given independently of the
share of government investment in total investment, it is now readily seen that
a rise in the share of government investment increases the government decit.
The required tax share t; which is determined by equation (5), will be indepen-
dent of . By contrast,  a¤ects the share of total government spending which
is given by  + g. Consequently, the importance of public investment intro-
duces a caveat with respect to the inverse relation between public decits and
successful development. The decits are increasing in , and to the extent that
successful development fast growth of the modern sector is associated with
active government intervention and a large share of government investment in
total investment, the implications for government decits become ambiguous.
Equation (5) and the formal analysis in this paper, fourth, has focused on
long-term growth, largely ignoring critical and di¢ cult issues of stabilization.
Macroeconomic instability deters long-term private investment, and aggregate
demand policy should aim to secure a stable macroeconomic environment with
appropriate levels and growth rates of demand for the output of the modern
sector. Recessions should be countered by expansionary measures but, equally
important, overheating of the economy should be avoided. The use of monetary
policy to target ination poses particular dangers in this respect. To the extent
that the use of interest rates to control ination is successful it may owe its
success in large part to the e¤ects on the real exchange rate. Exchange rate
appreciation can put a damper on ination, but overvalued exchange rates and
balance of payments crises can also do great damage. Large uctuations in real
exchange rates, more generally, impede the long-run development of a modern
tradable sector.11
As an illustration, consider the Brazilian experience since the early 2000s.
The Brazilian economy benetted from the commodities boom which saw broad
indices of commodity prices treble between 2002 and 2008 and then following
a blip immediately after the nancial crisis return to and uctuate around the
2008 level until 2014.
The commodities boom relaxed the balance of payments constraint, and
Brazilian GDP grew relatively fast at about 4 percent between 2003 and 2011.
The growth was driven in large part by consumption which increased at an aver-
age rate of about 5 percent. Private consumption was boosted by an impressive
reduction in inequality; the Gini coe¢ cient fell from about 58 percent in 2002 to
52 percent in 2014. The real minimum wage increased by more than 5 percent a
year between 2000 and 2014, and social transfers expanded signicantly, partly
11The argument in this section has a¢ nities with development theory, both new and old;
e.g. Razmi et al. (2012), Ros (2013), Bresser-Pereira et al. (2015), Damill et al. (2016).
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as a result of indexation of many programs to the minimum wage (Summa and
Serrano 2018). Policy intervention also contributed to a relaxation of credit
constraints. Household debt increased from 10 percent of GDP in 2003 to more
than about 25 percent by 2012; car sales more than trebled between 2002 and
2012; GDP from construction almost doubled between 2002 and 2012; and the
ratio of employment in non-tradables over tradables sector rose from about 1.15
in 2002 to more than 1.6 in 2015 (Garber et al. 2018).
Ination was kept in check by an appreciation of the Real. Ination, which
had peaked at over 17 percent in 2003, declined rapidly between 2003 and 2007,
as the exchange rate moved from 3.8 Reais to one US dollar in 2003 to 1.6 Reais
to the dollar in 2008. From 2007, however, ination started increasing again,
rising from about 3 percent in 2007 to about 10 percent in 2014. The current
account had moved into surplus in 2003 partly reecting the rise in commodity
prices and the benets of a real depreciation of the Real between 2000 and 2003
 but the surplus was short-lived. The current account soon deteriorated; it
moved into decit in 2007, and the decit widened in the following years.
By 2014 Brazil was already moving towards a recession when commodity
prices dropped precipitously. A deep recession followed, and ascendant right-
wing movements are busily working to reverse the gains in income distribution.
This rough outline raises several questions. The large reductions of inequality
were real achievements. But the distributional progress would have become
more sustainable and the economy would have been in a better state when
commodity prices collapsed, if some of the windfall gains from the commodity
boom had been used to expand the formal sector. The relaxation of the balance
of payments constraint could have allowed faster accumulation as well as some
increase in consumption, without running up decits on the current account.
This did not happen. The share of investment in GDP increased modestly
from a trough of about 18.5 percent of GDP in 2002-2005 to about 21 percent
2006-2008, but residential investment made up an increasing proportion of total
investment (and the overall investment share stayed below its levels in the mid
1990s and far below the levels in the 1970s). The prot share started to fall
from 2004 (Martins & Rugitsky 2018).
Putting it di¤erently, the analysis points to some unpleasant Marxian arith-
metic. In order to achieve signicant, sustainable gains for the poor as well as
an increase in accumulation, it may be necessary to confront entrenched inter-
est and cut luxury consumption. The commodities boom gave Brazilian policy
makers extra degrees of freedom, but their failure to confront the hard choices
sacriced accumulation and real progress in the structural transformation of the
Brazilian economy in favor of short term transfers. This left Brazil and the
left-wing movements in Brazil  in a bad place when the commodities boom
came to an end.
11
5 Conclusion
The general theme of this paper can be put succinctly: the supply side matters.12
It is important to make this fairly obvious point in part because the supply
side has not always received the attention it deserves in the post-Keynesian
literature.13
A recognition of the supply side has more than purely academic interest.
Aggregate demand policies that work well in one economy may be disastrous in
economies with a di¤erent supply side. The distinction between stylized mature
and dual economies illustrates this general point.
A permanent stimulus may be needed in mature Harrodian economies with
a low natural rate of growth. The warranted growth rate must be brought into
equality with the natural rate, and the scal stimulus is helpful precisely because
it retards the warranted rate. In dual economies, by contrast, a retardation of
the warranted growth rate is the opposite of what one wants. Policy, instead,
should aim at stabilizing the actual growth rate at a high warranted rate.
If the expansion of the capital stock relies on private investment, incentives
must be created for rms in the modern sector to carry out the investment.
Adequate demand for the formal-sector output becomes critical, and the man-
agement of aggregate demand becomes an essential prerequisite of fast growth.
But capital constraints complicate the picture: it is not enough to create incen-
tives for investment, the resources for investment must be available too.
In a capital constrained economy, a sustained increase in the rate of accu-
mulation requires reductions in the shares of private or public consumption (or
an increase in net imports). Simply boosting aggregate demand is not a viable
development strategy. Dual economies face a two-fold challenge. They must
create incentives for the expansion of the modern/dynamic/high-productivity
sector and ensure that the resources for expansion will be available.
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